Security

Actually, other books note that. Feynman merely noted the literature.

I was in the lecture when he noted Safecracker Suite (he wrote about it really, he hated writing, he taped it). This lecture is now avaliable in the latest collection reprinting Surely Your Joking and What Do you care... on an attached CD. The question for detail was asked by (I recognize the voice because he changed schools) by Rik Smoody (who used to post) and I last knew at Sony Labs. It's a wonderful CD and you get to hear his Brooklyn drawl. Fond memory.

My copy is at the Museum being listen to by the curator. Brits hated his voice.

So true. It was also a major method to cracking ciphertext. Especially late when people we rushing. It is still a major method to cracking ciphertext.

That is what Gell-Mann noted in his obit.

Feynman was protected by Oppie, but Groves had far greater problems of people he wanted fired or restricted in access, Szilard, most notabilty. Feynman was pretty low on the management ladder, but Oppie regarded him as his best man (if you read some literature; I think Bethe and Bohr also deserve credit, but it really was a team effort).

Well Boris Pash, head of security had only so many men, and independent of the FBI. Pash himself barely likely the job. In the end he ended up doing intelligence under fire in Europe tracking down the German program (he much preferred that).

You also have to understand that not just Oppie, but a fair number of these guys were European and American communists. Back before the Cold War before the shoe pounding incident at the UN and WWII, people were more optimistic about communism (even if others like Hoover were fearful).

To this day, at every lunch at the National Labs (I was struck by this at my first lunch at Livermore), there are political discussions, back then there was more Red. The thinking by many was that this info was going to be shared with the Soviets. Higher levels of govt. nixed that for a number of reasons (as contrast to what other technologies shared, and in fact the Brits got peeed at the end of the war when a lot of their stuff got nixed and they did their own work which culminated in a test in Austraila these buttumptions raise all kinds of questions {See satellite below}).

It's still in use.

Likely many more exist at low levels. Some of the Venona stuff has been released and is publically available. It requires a lot of interpretation in raw form. There are still unknowns about it. The Fort was just giving pounds of stuff I had to carry back for the Museum (inch thick govt. reports, nicely bound and covered).

Naw. At best only a few years. You have to give the Soviet scientists a lot of credit: they are very good physicists. Colleagues have visited their atomic cities. There is actually some regard on some of the info which got released. Too late. But you are right that the devils is in the details.

A lot of this stuff in other countries was known long ago with satellite and communications surveillance. It's amusing to see Soviet and Chinese gaseous diffusion plants from overhead. I can think of various empirical points in the process where they had to learn about things like neutron contagioning and graphite manufacturing, etc.

These have similar adjuncts inother fields like crypto, chemical weapons, etc.

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