Another Knoppix Rescue

wrote on Mon, 5 Dec 2005 22:49:35 +0000 (UTC)

The simplest method I can think of involves a "trusted computing center" implemented in hardware. The public key to this TCA would be within this center, resident to the computer proper. The private key would be held by the computer vendor, and to the OS vendor preloading the computer. The private key would also include information such as the unique CPU identifier. (Changing out the CPU will require reregistration in that case, an annoyance.)

A "broken key" would also be pbutted to the US government, to be held by the Executive and by the Judicial branches, in order to comply with a forthcoming court order if necessary. Upon rebuttembly the key can be used to masquerade the box. The procedures would be such that rebuttembly would require a warrant, just to keep the EFF and the ACLU happy -- if one can call anyone with this key system happy. I'm not happy; are you? :-)

But can't be too careful with al Qaeda running around, after all. Yeah, they're still dangerous; that's why everyone needs to be treated as though they are in a darkened room with a bright lightbulb over their heads and handcuffs on their feet as they sit in an uncomfortable stool for hours...

Of course no program can run unless the TCA authorizes it, which would require at the minimum a signature by the private key holder. Patches could be...interesting.

In the case of an "OS-less" box, the manufacturer thereof would have to produce on demand a certificate of declaration. This certificate would basically declare that the recipient of that box is not a person and will comply with all legal terms thereof, which includes among other things "no piracy", "no illegal software", and "no copying of things one shouldn't copy unless we get ours". The PC manufacturer would be required to sign all executables going onto the box, prior to their use. (Spot The Little Problem Here.)

In the case of a Linux box, more special dispensation would be required (Linux, after all, is used by more persons, pirates, and other such ne'er-do-wells* worldwide). This dispensation would be similar to the OS-less box, and would furthermore require additional safeguards to ensure that Microsoft gets a licensing cut per year, even though the user thereof is not using Microsoft products. Can't be too careful with al Qaeda running around, after ... oh, wait, wrong argument; I'll need a justification regarding some sort of online piracy, probably having to do with viruses and other such malware. After all, it's not Microsoft's fault that malware is running rampant amongst Windows systems which weren't properly designed to keep the malware out...is it?

Did we really want to go here today? :-)

It would help if they wouldn't keep shooting their own feet.

"Duh...putting Netscape will damage our desktop."

"Duh...TCO is really a valid concept."

"Duh...Linux can't do what we can do." (Namely, crash.)

"Duh...3 months? That's like a crazy uptime!"

But I for one expect DRM to stay, in some form. The reason is a simple one: big big money's behind it -- and not just Microsoft.

Not the prettiest of scenarios, admittedly.

The good news is that Sony seems to have also shot itself in the foot, and blown part of Microsoft's leg off in the process. So maybe DRM talk will be blunted for awhile while Sony looks for two pair of crutches. :-)

* well, OK, probably not, but who's to question the word of a highly profitable -- erm, I mean, reputable -- software monopoly?

-- It's still legal to go .sigless.